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"The Right to Bear Arms": Two Views
"If one considers the three
most critical modes of inter
pretation of the Second
Amendment - its
language, its history and
the intent of its founders,
and its consistent inter
pretation by the courts - it
is quite evident that the Se
cond Amendment does not
guarantee an individual's
right to bear arms."

By LEE FISHER
Attorney General,
State of Ohio

As Ohio's attorney general, I am frequently called upon
to address certain controversial issues from both subjective
policy and formal legal viewpoints. As the state's chief law
enforcement officer, I have a vested interest in effective
crime control measures.
Handgun control and, more specifically, the interpreta
tion of the Second Amendment with regard to an in
dividual's right to bear arms is certainly an area where my
statutory legal responsibility and policy agenda merge.
From a policy perspective, I support the right of law-abiding
citizens to own a gun.
However, with regard to the interpretation of the Second
Amendment, I firmly believe that there are few constitu
tional questions with such a clear-cut, definitive answer. If
one considers the three most critical modes of interpreta
tion of the Second Amendment - its language, its history
and the intent of its founders, and its consistent interpreta
tion by the courts - it is quite evident that the Second
Amendment does not guarantee an individual's right to bear
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"The Bill of Rights was
adopted to protect in
dividual rights. The Second
Amendment is no exception.
It guarantees the in
dividual right to keep and
bear arms . .. The Supreme
Court's rulings have always
been consistent with this in
tent and this interpretation

"

By DAVID C. TRYON
Porter, Wright, Morris & Arthur

The Bill of Rights was adopted to protect individual
rights. The Second Amendment is no exception. It
guarantees the individual right to keep and bear arms.
The framers considered this a pre-existing fundamental
right, essential to our freedom. The Supreme Court's rul
ings have always been consistent with this intent and this
interpretation. Unfortunately, some lower courts and the
media have chosen to ignore both the intent of the framers
and the Supreme Court's rulings and have claimed it
preserves only some nebulous "collective" right belonging
to everyone, but no one.
The right to bear arms has its roots in 12th century
England. At that time all freemen not only had the right
but also had the duty to own and possess arms. However,
as with all other "rights" given to subjects of a monarchy,
this right was periodically taken away and restored, depen
ding on the disposition of the king.
Whatever the status of the right in England, the colonies
clearly considered the right to bear arms an inalienable in-

Please turn to TRYON
on Page 952

CLE.VELAND BAR JOURNAL

JULY-AUGUST 1991

FISHER ...
Continued from the Previous Page
arms.
The Second Amendment reads: "A well regulated Militia
being necessary to the security of a free State, the right
of the people to keep and bear Arms, shall not be infringed."
Most Americans are familiar with only part of its
language, the abridged version emblazoned on the edifice
of the National Rifle Association's Washington, D.C., head
quarters: "The right of the people to keep and bear arms
shall not be infringed." The conspicuous omission of the first
13 words of the amendment - the most important 13 con
textually - speaks volumes.
It is precisely that language that expresses the purpose
and the limit of the right to keep and bear arms. This right
exists solely in its relation to the maintenance of a well
regulated militia and is not a constitutional safeguard of an
individual's right to keep and bear arms.

•
A review of the historical context which led the framers
of the Bill of Rights to adopt the Second Amendment in its
present form provides compelling evidence regarding their
intent.
Certain events that preceded the Revolutionary War 
namely the indiscriminate use of British troops by King
George III to collect taxes and "maintain order" in the col
onies - left the colonists with a strong aversion to stan
ding armies. Instead, they favored state militias, compos
ed of ordinary citizens who would presumably be more
responsive to the will of the people.
When the new Constitution was submitted to the states
for ratification, the battle lines were drawn between the
Federalists and the Anti-Federalists - the latter believ
ing that a bill of rights was necessary to properly restrain
the power of the central government.
The Second Amendment specifically addressed concerns
articulated by individuals like George Mason at the Virginia
ratification convention:
"The militia may here be destroyed by that method
which has been practiced in other parts of the world
before; that is, by rendering them useless - by dis
arming them. Under various pretences, Congress may
neglect to provide for arming and disciplining the
militia; and the state governments cannot do it, for
Congress has an exclusive right to arm them ..." 3
J. Elliot, "The Debates in the Several State Conven
tions of the Adoption of the Federal Constitution" (2d
ed. 1836, at 379 [hereinafter cited as "Elliot's
Debates"].
The Anti-Federalist concern, therefore, was that Con
gress might allow the state militias to die simply by failing
to arm them.
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The Virginia Convention proposed 20 amendments to the
text of the Constitution, including that "each state respec
tively shairhave the power to provide for organizing, arm
ing and disciplining its own militias, wheresoever Congress
shall omit or neglect to provide for the same." "Elliot's
Debates," supra, at 663. There is no suggestion in the
Virginia debates that the delegates were concerned with
an individual's right to possess weapons outside the militia
context.
In order to avoid a new Constitutional Convention that
might reconsider the entire document, Federalist James
Madison drafted a bill of rights for presentation at the First
Congress. His draft of the provision that became the Se
cond Amendment read:
"The right of the people to keep and bear arms shall
not be infringed; a well armed and well regulated
militia being the best security of a free country; but
no person religiously scrupulous of bearing arms shall
be compelled to render military service in person."
E. Dumbauld, "The Bill of Rights and What It Means
Today," 207 (1957) [hereinafter cited as "Dumbauld").
Thus, the "right to keep and bear arms" was introduced
into the language of the proposed amendment (it had been
omitted from the Virginia Convention proposal) but only as
part of a provision dealing with military matters.
There is no indication from the history of the Second
Amendment that the founders were seeking a broad
guarantee of the individual right to own firearms for any
purpose. On the contrary, the expressed intention of the
framers was to guarantee that state militias remained arm
ed and viable, and the "right to keep and bear arms" must
be understood as implementing that purpose.
The implication of this intention is that constitutionality
of a statute regulating firearms should turn on whether the
statute affects firearms in such a way as to adversely af
fect a state's ability to raise and maintain an armed "well
regulated militia."

•
The judicial interpretation of the Second Amendment has
consistently reinforced this view of the framers' intent and
the context in which the language was drafted.
With the exception of one 1902 ruling of the Idaho
Supreme Court, In re Brickey, 70 P. 609 (1902), the courts
have been unanimous in refusing to apply the Second
Amendment to state regulation of firearms.
See, e.g., Quilici v. Village of Morton Grove, 695 F.2d 261,
270 (7th Cir.1982), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 863 (1983); Applica
tion of Atkinson, 291N.W.2d996, 398 n.1 (Minn.1980); State
v. Amos, 343 So.2d 166, 168 (La. 1977); Commonwealth v.
Davis, 343 N.E.2d 847, 850 (Mass. 1976); Cases v. United
States, 131 F.2d 916, 921-22 (1st Cir. 1942), cert. denied, 319
U.S. 770 (1943).
In United States v. Miller, 307 U.S. 174 (1939), the
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Supreme Court directly addressed the scope of the Second
Amendment and its impact on federal gun laws. The issue
was whether the National Firearms Act of 1934 violated the
Second Amendment insofar as the statute barred the in
terstate transportation of an unregistered shotgun having
a barrel length of less than 18 inches.
As noted previously, the court held that the amendment
must be applied in light of its "obvious purpose" to assure
the continuation of state militias. Miller at 178. The court
upheld the statute because no showing had been made that
private ownership of sawed-off shotguns had any relation
to preservation of a well regulated militia. Miller, at 178.
Miller, however, is not the Supreme Court's last word on
the subject.
In Lewis v. United States, 445 U.S. 55 (1980), the court
upheld the federal statute barring convicted felons from
possessing firearms against equal protection attack.
Significantly, the court determined that the statute need
ed only a "rational basis" to survive constitutional attack
because "[t]hese legislative restrictions on the use of
firearms are neither based upon constitutionally suspect
criteria, nor do they trench upon any constitutionally pro
tected liberties." Lewis, at 65, n. 8 (emphasis added). Miller
is cited in support of this proposition.
Following Miller's direction that a firearms statute is un
constitutional only if it adversely affects a state's ability
to maintain a militia, the lower federal courts consistently
have upheld laws regulating the private ownership of
firearms. These cases reject the existence of a broad right
to bear arms for purposes other than in a state militia.
See, e.g., Eckert v. City of Philadelphia, 477 F.2d 610 (3d
Cir. 1973) ("... the right to keep and bear arms is not a right
given by the United States Constitution"); United States
v. Johnson, 497 F.2d 548, 550 (4th Cir. 1974) (statute barr
ing felons from transporting firearms in interstate com
merce is constitutional because there is no evidence that
it " .. .in any way affects the maintenance of a well regulated
militia").
Of the modern federal court decisions, the most far
reaching is the Seventh Circuit's in Morton Grove in which
the court upheld a local ban on the possession of handguns
against a Second Amendment challenge, not only because
the amendment does not apply to the state but also because
"... the right to bear arms is inextricably connected to the
preservation of a militia ... the right to keep and bear han
dguns is not guaranteed by the second amendment." Mor
ton Grove, at 270.

of the hands of criminals will continue for many years to
come.
But those who rely on the Second Amendment as justifica
tion for an individual's right to bear arms are misconstru
ing the language, the intent of the framers, and judicial
precedent regarding this amendment.
•

•

After the Revolution, when several states began to
discuss the Constitution, the framers rejected the British
concept that British subjects had the rights which the parlia-

I am sure the debate about how best to keep guns out
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Author's Note: Portions of this article were borrowed
from "The Second Amendment: What It Really Means" by
Sarah Brady and "The Right To Be Armed: A Constitutional
Illusion" by Dennis A. Hengan with their permission.
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dividual right. (In fact, it was more firmly entrenched as
a civil right than the right of free speech, which was fre
quently severely restricted if it did not comport with the
majority opinion.)
As early as 1632, the Plymouth Colony not only allowed
but required the inhabitants to each own a musket and am
munition therefor. In 1677, it required them to own the much
more modern and effective flintlocks (while the English Ar
my was still using the older matchlocks).
Other colonies had similar la\VS. In fact, in 1644,
Massachusetts passed a law actually fining those who were
not armed!
Throughout the 17th and 18th centuries, gun ownership
and public carrying of firearms was a commonly accepted
practice, even in the established cities which were no longer
threatened by Indians and wild animals.
In fact, when British Government troops landed in the
New England city of Boston, its citizens were enraged and
proceeded to arm themselves to defend their liberties and
properties from the soldiers. When some loyalists objected,
other citizens pointed out that this was nothing more than
an exercise of their rights as British subjects pursuant to
the British Declaration of Rights.
Subsequently, in 177 4 and 1775, the British conducted
several raids on colony militia arsenals. These attempts to
disarm American citizens were one of the causes of the
American Revolution. Finally, one such raid resulted in a
skirmish killing several colonists and many British soldiers
- and thus began the American Revolution.

•
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ment and the king gave them. Under the Constitution, the
people had "inalienable rights" and the government had only
the powers which the people gave it in the Constitution.
One of the reasons the Constitution was so controversial
was because the states distrusted central governments sup
ported by standing armies and select militias (such as the
modern day National Guard). Therefore, they gave the
government very limited powers for such military groups
in the Constitution.
However, this was not enough for some who demanded
a Bill of Rights containing guarantees of individual rights,
including the right to bear arms, such as that contained in
the English Declaration of Rights. This would prevent
governmental oppression of the people and prevent the
government from taking away other rights.
When New Hampshire cast the last vote adopting the
Constitution in 1789, it included a recommendation for a Bill
of Rights with this provision: "Congress shall never disarm
any citizen unless such as are or have been in actual
rebellion."
(Most states had already adopted their own Bill of Rights,
the majority of which included the right to keep and bear
arms. Pennsylvania's was the first, and it included "the right
of the citizens to bear arms in defense of themselves and
the State ..." Ohio adopted the same provision in 1803.)
This view - that individuals had the right to bear arms,
and that their bearing those arms was good for the coun
try - seems to have been universal among the members
of the First Continental Congress and other early patriots:
• Richard Henry Lee: "To preserve liberty, it is essen
tial that the whole body of the people always possess arms."
• Patrick Henry: "The great object is that every man be
armed."
• Tench Cox (a prominent Federalist): "Implements of war
are the 'birthright of an American' ..."
•Thomas Jefferson: "No free man shall ever be debarred
the use of arms."
• Alexander Hamilton: "The best we can hope for con
cerning the people at large is that they be properly armed."
•George Washington: "[Firearms are] next in importance
to the Constitution itself," they are the "American people's
liberty teeth" and "they deserve a place of honor with all
that's good."
• William Blackstone Oegal commentator): "The right of
having and using arms for self-preservation and defense"
is a "liberty of Englishmen " (1803 commentary).
Indeed, none of them ever asserted the idea that the
states or the military, rather than individual citizens, have
the "right" to be armed.

•
Congress reconvened to prepare a Bill of Rights, Madison
prepared the initial draft of the Bill of Rights. His intent
of its meaning was evidenced by his statement that
"Americans have the right and advantage of being armed
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- unlike the citizens of other countries whose governments
are afraid to trust the people with arms." While some
amendments were heavily debated and others removed en
tirely, there was very little controversy on this amendment.
The two main debates on the wording were, first, to limit
the right to use "for the common defense." This was re
jected, indicating the right was personal and did not apply
only to a select militia repulsing a foreign invader.
Second, there was a debate as to whether to include a
clause preventing the government from forcing conscien
tious objectors to bear arms. That provision was also re
jected.
(Consequently, the Second Congress enacted the Militia
Act of 1792 which defined the Militia as all able-bodied free
males, and required them to own firearms and ammunition
to be used if they were called into action.)
As adopted, the Second Amendment consists of two con
cepts. First, the framers recognized that "A well regulated
Militia" is "necessary to the security of a free State," and,
without that, the state would not long remain secure or free.
The militia referred to therein was not a select militia (such
as the modern-day National Guard) but rather all able-bodied
freemen who were to supply their own weapons.
Thus, the second element consisted of a guarantee of the
right to keep and bear arms to at least all who constitute
such a militia. In fact, it went further than the Fourth
Amendment (which allows reasonable searches) and pro
hibited any infringement on the right to keep and bear arms.
But if a state fails to maintain a well regulated militia,
that does not destroy the right; it only means that the securi
ty of that state may be in jeopardy. The right which was
guaranteed and which "shall not be infringed" is the right
of the people (not the state or a select militia) to "keep and
bear arms." If it is infringed, a well regulated militia can
not be maintained and the security of the free state may
be in danger.

•
The early judicial discussions of the right to bear arms
are consistent with the intent behind the Second
Amendment.
• Kentucky's high court voided a concealed weapon
statute as conflicting with Kentucky's Bill of Rights provi
sion "that the right of the citizens to bear arms in defense
of themselves and the state shall not be questioned." Bliss
v. Commonwealth, 12 Ky. 90 (1822).
• The Louisiana high court stated that the "right to carry
arms ... is a right guaranteed by the Constitution of the
United States ..."State v. Chandler, 5 La. App. 489, 52
Am. Dec. 599 (1850).
• The Alabama Supreme Court determined that the
Alabama Constitution protected the individual's "right to
bear arms in defense of himself and the state" but allowed
the Legislature to regulate "the manner in which arms shall
be borne." State v. Reid, 1 Ala. 612 (1840).
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• In 1846, the Georgia Supreme Court recognized the
right to bear arms as a fundamental inalienable right. While
it recognized that the U.S. Bill of Rights did not restrict
state action (Barron v. Baltimore, 32 U.S. 243 (1833)), it
struck down a handgun ban based on that right, which it
determined existed with or without the U.S. Constitution.
Nunn v. State, 1 Ga. 243 (1846).
Thus, the earliest interpretations considered it an in
dividual right.
The first U.S. Supreme Court comment on the Second
Amendment was in 1857. The court clearly stated (albeit
in dicta) that individual citizens had the right to "keep and
carry arms wherever they went." Dred Scott v. Sanford,
60 U.S. (19 How.) 393 (1857).
The first Supreme Court case actually ruling on the Sec
ond Amendment was U.S. v. Cruikshank, 92 U.S. 542 (1876).
The court stated that the First and Second Amendments
restricted only federal action; but those rights were not
created by the Bill of Rights but existed prior to the
adoption thereof:
"The right there [Second Amendment] specified is that
of 'bearing arms for lawful purpose'. This is not a right
granted by the Constitution. Neither is it in any man
ner dependent upon that instrument for its existence."
92 U.S. at 553.
This case was followed in 1886 by a criminal prosecution
of a group of civilians 'parading with arms' as a military com
pany. (Presser v. Illinois, 116 U.S. 252 (1886).) The 14th
Amendment still hadn't been interpreted to extend the Bill
of Rights to state action, and therefore the court found the ·
state law did not conflict with the Second Amendment. In
dicta the court made clear its views as to the meaning of
the Second Amendment:
"It is undoubtedly true that all citizens capable of

bearing arms constitute the reserve military force or
reserve militia of the United States as well as of the
states; and ... [therefore] the states cannot, even lay
ing the constitutional provision in question out of view,
prohibit the people from keeping and bearing arms,
so as to deprive the United States of their rightful
resource while maintaining the public security, and
disable the people from performing their duty to the
general government." (Emphasis added.) 116 U.S. at
265.
Eight years later, the court suggested that the 14th
Amendment might make the Second Amendment applicable
to state action but declined to so hold since the defendant
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had failed to raise that issue in the trial court. Miller v.
Texas, 153 U.S. 536 (1894). (It wasn't until 1897 that the court
determined that the 14th Amendment applies certain
aspects of the Bill of Rights to state action. Since then, the
court hasn't reviewed any cases involving state action infr
inging on the right to bear arms.)
Then, in 1939, the court faced the meaning of the Second
Amendment squarely and formulated a test. Jack Miller was
convicted for violation of the National Firearms Act (thus
the 14th Amendment was not involved) by virtue of his
possession of a sawed-off shotgun. The court stated:
"In the absence of any evidence tending to show that
possession or use of a 'shotgun having a barrel less
than 18 inches in length' at this time has some
reasonable relationship to the preservation or efficien
cy of a well regulated militia, we cannot say that the
Second Amendment guarantees the right to keep and
bear such an instrument. Certainly it is not within
judicial notice that this weapon is any part of the or
dinary military equipment or that its use could con
tribute to the common defense. Aymett v. State, 2
Humph.154, 158." U.S. v. Miller, 307 U.S.174at178.
Thus, if a "weapon" is a "militia arm," the Second Amend
ment guarantees individuals the right to keep and bear such
weapon. (Note that Aymett stood for the proposition that
individual citizens could possess ordinary military weapons.)
Had the court believed this to be a collective right rather
than an individual one, it would have ignored the issue of
the militia usage of the firearms and would have simply
stated that Miller had no right to own any gun.

•
To this point, the federal courts had followed the clear
intent of the framers. However, some lower courts soon
began to rebel from the original intent and from the holdings
of the Supreme Court.
In 1942, the First Circuit interpreted Miller to mean that
the Second Amendment guarantees individuals the right
to bear any 'arms' which can be used by a militia. The court
then refused to follow the Supreme Court's test (and so
stated) because of the broad range of 'arms' that would be
included. Instead, the court required that the 'arms' be in
actual use by a militia to gain Second Amendment protec
tion. Cases v. United States, 131 F.2d 916, cert. den. 319
U.S. 770 (1st Cir. 1942), rehearing den. 324 U.S. 889 (1945).
In the same year, the Third Circuit invented the "collec
tivist" theory. U.S. v. Tot, 131 F.2d 261 (3d Cir. 1942) rev'd
on other grounds 319 U.S. 463 (1943). The court held that
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the right to bear arms is not absolute and therefore felons,
maniacs, and children could be prohibited from possession
of firearms. While it is true that no rights are absolute, the
court then made a monumental leap in logic, misquoted
Miller, and declared (in dicta and without much analysis)
that the Second Amendment did not protect individual
rights, only states' rights to maintain a militia organization.
The court also adopted the requirement from Miller that
the 'arms' protected must be related to a 'well regulated
militia.'
Thus, one circuit recognized the Miller test but refused
to follow it, and another mischaracterized it and created its
own law.
Since then, most circuit courts facing the issue (usually
in connection with a convicted felon owning a firearm and
represented by inadequate legal counsel, if any) have con
tinued to ignore the Miller test and adopted the Tot dicta,
holding the Second Amendment inapplicable to individuals.
Some courts and commentators have suggested that this
interpretation is mandated by the clause "the right of the
people," claiming that "people" means the states. However,
the Supreme Court specifically stated in U.S. v. Verdugo
Urquidez, 110 S.Ct. 1839 494
(1990), that "people,"
as used in the Second Amendment, means individual
citizens. (Note also that when the framers meant to protect
states rights, they used the word "states"; to protect in
dividual rights they used the word "people.'' See Amend
ment X.)
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Others have suggested that the Second Amendment ap
plies only to states because of the initial reference to the
militia. They argue that the militia is the National Guard,
and the Second Amendment only guarantees to the states
the right to arm the National Guard.
However, the Supreme Court made it clear in Miller that
the "militia" constitutes all male citizens, not just those
enrolled in a branch of the military. More recently, the
Supreme Court held that the National Guard is under the
control of the Federal Government, not the states. Perpich
v. Department of Defense, 110 S.Ct. 2418, 498 U.S. _ __
(1990).
Therefore; the National Guard is not in a position to fulfill
the purpose of protecting the individual states either from
federal or foreign aggression, especially when the federal
government sends them abroad for training or combat. (Note
also that the plaintiff governors in Perpich did not claim
that the Second Amendment protected the states' interest
in the National Guard.)
This effectively overrules U.S. v. Tot and its progeny
which claim that the Second Amendment protects state
militia organizations from encroachment of federal power.
Thus, the Supreme Court has ruled against the underly
ing arguments for the "collectivist" theory, leaving the "in
dividual" interpretation and the Miller test intact. (Note that
Lewis v. U.S., 445 U.S. 55, 65 Fn. 8 (1980), appears to en
dorse the Miller test.)
History makes clear that when the framers of the Bill of
Rights referred to the militia in the Second Amendment
they meant all able-bodied men. Congress (see 10 U.S.C. Sec.
311) and the Supreme Court (see Presser, Miller, and Per
pichl have continued to endorse that interpretation. While
such a force might not be suitable for some military actions,
it can be, and has been, used for its intended purpose 
protection of the individual states from aggression, both
foreign and domestic (such as during World War II, the Civil
War, and the Spanish-American War).
While the need for such a militia may not be obvious now,
no one knows what the future may bring. The Bill of Rights
is meant to protect rights for the future as well as the
present.
Nevertheless, similar modern-day usage does exist. Local
groups banding together to protect their neighborhoods are
essentially modern-day militias, and self-defense efforts also
fall within that general concept.

•
In view of current Second Amendment Jurisprudence,
what "gun control" laws would be constitutional?
Clearly, the government can (and does) prevent felons,
children, and mentally disabled individuals from possess
ing firearms. The Supreme Court has upheld laws register
ing owners of machine guns. Laws highly regulating posses
sion of explosives and banning possession of bazookas, hand
grenades, tanks, howitzers, etc., remain unchallenged and
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However, laws banning semi-automatic firearms (carry
ing the misnomer "assault weapons") clearly violate the
Miller test. Morgan, "Assault Rifle Legislation: Unwise and
Unconstitutional," 17 Am. J. of Crim. Law 143 (Winter 1990).
Claims that these firearms are not used for hunting or spor
ting purposes are irrelevant to the constitutional issues.
Waiting periods, whether or not desirable, may well also
be deficient (a waiting period on the exercise of a constitu
tional right is invalid. Akron v. Akron Center for Reproduc
tive Health, 462 U.S. 416 (1983)). Thus, much of the current
push for "gun control" may need to be refocused on "crime
control."
Like the Third Amendment and the Tenth Amendment,
the importance of the Second Amendment is often disparag
ed by some as having no modern-day relevance. However,
87 percent of Americans believe, and most published law
review articles argue, that the Second Amendment
guarantees individuals the right to bear arms. ("Decision
Making Information, Attitudes of the American Electorate
Toward Gun Control" (1978)). The history of the Second
Amendment and Supreme Court interpretations thereof
support that belief.
Those who argue that it gives no such right must now
show how the "collectivist" interpretation squares with the
recent Supreme Court holdings in U.S. v. Verdugo-Urquidez
and Perpich v. Department of Defense.
If society deems the Miller test too broad, or gun posses
sion too dangerous for individuals, the issues should be given
full debate in an attempt to revise or repeal the Second
Amendment. Until then, the right to bear arms remains a
viable, fundamental, and inalienable right guaranteed by the
Constitution and relied upon by millions of Americans.

•
Author's Note: For further reading on the subject see:
BOOKS
S. Halbrook, "A Right to Bear Arms: State and Federal Bills of
Rights and Constitutional Guarantees," Greenwood Press, Inc.
(1989).
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D. Hardy, "Origins and Development of the Second Amendment,''
Blacksmith Corp. (1986).
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637 (1989).
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